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Abstract 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has 
worked as the continent's watchdog, under the ACHPR, for 
almost 30 years. Much has changed since the time of its 
inception. More institutions, set to ensure the implementation of 
the ACHPR, have been added. As the African Court on Human 
and Peoples' Rights became operational, a two-tiered human 
rights system was created.  
This article explores the inter-relationship between the ACHPR, 
the Protocol Establishing the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the Procedural Rules of these two 
institutions within the specific context of the African 
Commission's mandate to refer communications to the African 
Court. The aim is to offer a purposeful interpretation of the 
Procedural Rules governing referrals, guided by the 
understanding of the principle of complementarity in the 
preparatory works. The author argues that an appropriate 
interpretation of complementarity, within the context of referrals, 
becomes vital in alleviating one of the long-term plagues of the 
African, protective, human rights system, namely the lack of 
resources and human capital. It is suggested that the African 
Commission and the African Court can only be effective if they 
take proper cognisance of the principle of complementarity, in 
referring and receiving communications. 
Keywords 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights; African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights; referrals; complementarity; human 
rights; gross violations of human rights; individual 
communications. 
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1  Introduction 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereafter the 
Commission) has worked as the continent's watchdog, under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights1 (hereafter the ACHPR), for almost 
30 years. Much has changed since the time of its inception. The respect for 
human rights, conceived as a means mainly to promote international 
cooperation, in the Charter of Organisation of African Unity2 (hereafter the 
OAU Charter), now constitutes one of the main objectives of the African 
Union (hereafter the AU).3 More institutions set to ensure the 
implementation of the ACHPR have been added. The Protocol Establishing 
the Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter the Protocol) was 
adopted in 1998 and came into force in 2004. As the African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (hereafter the Court) became operational, a 
two-tiered human rights system was created. 4 Presently, the Commission 
and the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child5 are the 
main human rights institutions populating the African human rights structure, 
together with the Court.  
The jurisdiction of the Court extends to all cases and disputes submitted to 
it concerning the interpretation and application of the ACHPR, the Protocol 
and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the states 
concerned.6 The mandate of the Commission encompasses the inter-
pretation of all provisions of the ACHPR as well as ensuring the protection 
of human and peoples' rights under conditions laid down by the ACHPR.7 
Furthermore, both institutions have the mandate to receive individual and 
inter-state8 complaints concerning human rights violations. In this regard it 
is clear that there is considerable overlap in the jurisdiction and locus standi 
of these two institutions.  
                                            
* Annika Rudman. LLB LLM (Lund), PhD (Gothenburg). Professor, Department of 
Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. E-mail: 
arudman@sun.ac.za. 
1  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981). 
2  Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (1963). 
3  Article 2(1)(e) of the OAU Charter and arts 3(h) and 4(m) of the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union (2000). 
4  Viljoen 2004-2005 Brook J Int'l L 22. 
5  Not discussed further in this article. 
6  Article 3 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Establishment of a Court on Human and People’s Rights (1998). 
7  Article 45 (2) and (3) ACHPR. 
8  I shall not make any further reference to this type of complaint in this article. 
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Moreover, article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol provides the Commission with locus 
standi to bring cases before the Court. Direct access to the Court by 
individuals and NGOs with observer status before the Commission is 
restricted by state parties' express consent under article 34(6) of the 
Protocol. Therefore, the Commission has a very important role to perform 
as a conduit to the Court in cases where the original complainants lack direct 
access to the Court.9  
The coexistence of multiple institutions set up to protect and uphold the 
human rights provided in the ACHPR necessitates a relationship between 
the relevant institutions. The principle set to govern this relationship is the 
principle of complementarity, as tellingly described by Clapham10 as a 
"notion in motion". Considering on the one hand the over-lapping 
jurisdictions of the Commission and the Court and on the other the important 
role the Commission could play as a party before the Court, an appropriate 
understanding of the meaning of complementarity, as the principle set to 
guide this interaction, becomes essential. 
Complementarity is referred to in the preamble to the Protocol as well as in 
articles 2 and 8. Article 2 stipulates that the Court should complement the 
protective mandate of the Commission, while the Preamble speaks to the 
point of the reinforcement of the efforts of the Commission under its 
protective mandate. Article 8 stipulates that: 
The Rules of Procedure of the Court shall lay down the detailed conditions 
under which the Court shall consider cases brought before it, bearing in mind 
the complementarity between the Commission and the Court. 
Articles 2 and 8 do not offer any further guidance to the meaning or 
application of "complementarity" but simply refer to the principle itself. 
Elsheikh11 suggests that because complementarity is such an abstract 
concept, left undefined in the Protocol, the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission and the Court should give distinct, practical meaning to this 
concept. In 2002, when Elsheikh discussed this idea, the Procedural Rules 
of the Court and Commission12 had not yet been published. These rules 
                                            
9  Thus far 8 states (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Benin) have made a declaration under art 34(6) of the Protocol. On the 
24th of February 2016, the government of Rwanda sent a note verbale officially 
withdrawing its declaration to the AU Commission and the African Court.  
10  Clapham 2000 Hum Rts LJ 313. 
11  Elsheikh 2002 AHRLJ 254.  
12  Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2010) 
(hereafter the Rules of the Commission); Rules of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples' Rights (2010) (hereafter the Rules of the Court). 
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were issued only in 2010, six years after the Court became operational. 
Ebobrah13 in his analysis of the reference to complementarity in the Rules 
of the Commission significantly concludes that "the rules have not gone too 
far beyond the instruments in explaining how the concept is to be applied in 
practice". In a situation where resources are scarce, it is important to 
promote an approach where the best-situated institution performs a 
mandate to the exclusion of the other in a determined hierarchy of oversight. 
Complementarity, if properly defined, has, as I argue further below, the 
potential of offering guidance in this regard.  
2  Scope 
As highlighted by Elsheikh14 and Ebobrah15 there have been on-going calls 
for procedural rules to help to delineate the meaning of complementarity in 
the relationship between the Commission and the Court. In this article I set 
out to explore the inter-relationship between the Protocol and the 
Procedural Rules of these two institutions within the specific context of the 
Commission's mandate to refer cases to the Court. Of specific interest is 
rule 118 of the Rules of the Commission, which indicate when and how the 
Commission can refer a complaint to the Court. The Commission's role as 
a conduit to the Court is fairly unchartered territory. There is no guidance in 
the Rules of the Commission as to whether individual complainants would, 
as in the Inter-American system, have any influence over the Commission's 
decision to refer a communication to the Court. To date the Commission 
has brought only three cases before the Court.16 At the time of writing only 
one of these cases had been finalised.17  
It is the process under article 55 of the ACHPR, where individual complaints 
can be instituted, which mainly indicates the need for a referral as set out in 
rule 118 of the Rules of the Commission. The process before the 
Commission pertaining to an individual compliant submitted under article 55 
of the ACHPR can be described in five general phases18; phase 1 
                                            
13  Ebobrah 2011 EJIL 665. 
14  Elsheikh 2002 AHRLJ 256. 
15  Ebobrah 2011 EJIL 681. 
16  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya Application No 004/2011 
(finalised); African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights v Kenya Application 
No 006/2012 (pending decision); African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
v Libya Application No 002/2013 (pending decision). 
17  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya Application No 004/2011. 
18  Rule 98 of the Rules of the Commission furthermore stipulates that the Commission 
can ask a state to adopt provisional measures "At any time after the receipt of a 
Communication and before a determination on the merits". 
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registration; phase 2 consideration of locus standi19; phase 3 seizure;20 
phase 4 considerations of admissibility21 and phase 5 considerations of the 
merits.22 As there is no provision in the Protocol that explicitly requires the 
Commission to conclude either on the admissibility or merits of a 
communication before submitting it to the Court, and the Court is competent 
to consider and decide the admissibility and merits of a case. A referral can 
take place at any stage of the process (phases 2-5)23 in accordance with 
rule 118 of the Rules of the Commission. Consequently, the referral of a 
case puts the spotlight on the principle of complementarity because it 
involves a risk of overlapping actions and reflects a need for a proper 
delineation of tasks and mandates. 
The question I seek to address in this article is therefore whether referring 
a case before the consideration of admissibility is compatible with the 
principle of complementarity? Furthermore, is it beneficial, from the 
perspective of resource and time management, for the institutions involved 
to approach referrals in this fluent way, not requiring the mandate of each 
institution to complement the other? Should the Court perhaps utilise its 
mandate under article 6(1) of the Protocol to request the opinion of the 
Commission when deciding on the admissibility of cases instituted under 
article 5(3), to encourage the Commission to present its findings to the Court 
as it refers a case? 
It is clear from the contents of rule 118 that different scenarios were 
considered and thus incorporated into the Rules of the Commission. Rule 
118(1) stipulates a full consideration of the case ie including admissibility 
and merits; and rules 118(2), (3) and (4) indicate that a case can be referred 
either directly or after partial consideration. It is with regard to the latter rules 
                                            
19  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 304. 
20  Once a communication has been registered, the Commission has to be seized with it. 
Art 55 of the ACHPR provides that "Before each session of the Commission, the 
Secretary of the Commission prepares a list of all communications submitted to the 
Secretariat, other than those of State parties (…) and transmits them to the members 
of the Commission, who shall indicate which communications shall be considered by 
the Commission". Rule 102 (2) of the Rules of the Commission provides that "No 
communications concerning a State which is not a party to the Charter shall be 
received by the Commission or placed in a list". 
21  Article 56 of the ACHPR. 
22  The seizure, admissibility and merits of a communication are considered at separate 
meetings of the Commission. See for example Article 19 v Eritrea 2007 AHRLR 73 
(ACHPR 2007) paras 10-42. 
23  Arguably the Commission would not refer a case before it has registered it and 
concluded that the state party against which the complaint is brought is a party to the 
ACHPR and that the person or entity bringing the complaint is competent to do so. 
The ACHPR and the Rules of the Commission do not stipulate any "victim" 
requirement; see Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 304. 
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that the principle of complementarity could be used to guide the process of 
referrals. An appropriate interpretation of complementarity in the context of 
referrals, I argue, becomes essential in alleviating one of the long-term 
plagues of the African protective human rights system, namely the lack of 
resources and human capital. As we are now entrusted with a two-tiered 
system of human rights protection the procedure could, I argue, focus more 
on optimising the strengths of the two institutions involved rather than on 
trying to circumvent the Commission as far as possible. In this discussion I 
acknowledge that the fact-finding capacity of the Commission has not been 
utilised to its fullest potential and that it is essential to avoid the creation of 
new bottlenecks.24 However, as is suggested in the preparatory works 
(discussed under paragraph 3 below), a different role of the Commission 
could be envisaged. This is furthermore strengthened by a comparison with 
the functioning of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(hereafter the IACHR) and the Inter-American Court (hereafter the IAC) in 
the Inter-American human rights system. 
The main assumption that guided this research was the idea that even 
though it seemed possible to refer a case at any stage under rules 118(2), 
(3) and (4), ignoring complementarity in this context would erode the 
Commissions functions. A referral without any consideration of the 
admissibility of a case would fail to effectively use the available resources 
and it would establish what Viljoen refers to as "Commission-mediated 
direct access" as the primary rule, not the exception.25 The main argument, 
in this regard, is that referring a case after admissibility has been confirmed 
could potentially decrease the duplication of processes, which would result 
in a more efficient burden sharing, a swifter process and less cost.26 The 
Court could limit its engagement with cases referred to it by the Commission 
to the merits, and explore the procedural side of cases only if it finds the 
recommendation of the Commission to be suspicious or even incorrect. The 
aim of this article is to offer a purposeful interpretation of rule 118 (2), (3) 
and (4) guided firstly by the understanding of the principle of 
complementarity in the preparatory works; and secondly as an outcome of 
the interaction between the two sets of Rules of Procedure, the Protocol and 
the ACHPR. To achieve this aim, the article is divided into 6 paragraphs. 
Paragraph 3 directs attention to the four draft protocols put forward in the 
process of establishing the current Protocol and the way the process of 
                                            
24  Viljoen 2004-2005 Brook J Int'l L 32. 
25  Viljoen 2004-2005 Brook J Int'l L 25. 
26  Similar arguments were suggested by Viljoen and Murray before the conclusion of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Commission and Court. See Viljoen 2004-2005 Brook J Int'l 
L 32; and Murray 2002 AHRLJ 198-199. 
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referrals was designed and finally concluded. Paragraph 4 provides brief 
comments on the system of referrals under the Inter-American system as a 
contrast to the African system. Paragraph 5 outlines and discusses the 
principles of complementarity in more detail within the context of the referral 
mechanism under the Rules of the Commission and the Court. The last 
paragraph is the concluding section of the article. 
3  Conceptions of complementarity in the drafting 
process of the Protocol  
The creation of a human rights system where both a commission and a court 
would exist complementarily to each other was envisaged at the inception 
of the ACHPR.27 However, it was later decided that the Commission would 
receive greater focus in order to get the promotional and protective human 
rights mandate off the ground.28 It is notable that further activity to establish 
the Court was generated not by the OAU but "by international human rights 
non-governmental organisations (…) such as the Geneva-based 
International Commission of Jurists (…), who prepared the early drafts of 
the Protocol".29 The impetus behind the creation of the first draft protocol 
was the ineffectual work of the Commission in the five years it had been 
operating, as seen through the lens of NGOs and human rights experts 
involved on the continent.30 The solution was a court that would give teeth 
to the ACHPR and serve as a more efficient institution than the Commission. 
Interestingly, as explained by Pityana31, the Commission did not initiate any 
of these activities and it committed itself to the Court only in 1998. 
In 1994 the ICJ concluded the first draft protocol (hereafter the ICJ 
Protocol).32 This draft, established without any involvement of the state 
parties to the ACHPR, confirmed the centrality of the principle of 
complementarity.33 It also established the Commission as a party entitled to 
petition the Court.34 This position did not change during the continued 
drafting process. However, the requirements for such a petition and the 
                                            
27  Pityana 2004 AHRLJ 121. 
28  Pityana 2004 AHRLJ 121. 
29  Pityana 2004 AHRLJ 121-122. 
30  Pityana 2004 AHRLJ 122. 
31  Pityana 2004 AHRLJ 122. 
32  [ICJ] Draft Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
prepared by the experts assembled by the OAU General Secretariat in collaboration 
with the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International 
Commission of Jurists, 26-28 January 1994, Geneva, Switzerland (First Draft 
Additional Protocol to the African Charter On Human and Peoples’ Rights (1994)). 
33  Article 2 of the ICJ Protocol. 
34  Article 18(1) of the ICJ Protocol. 
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jurisdiction of the Court changed drastically throughout the following drafting 
process, once the state parties to the ACHPR got involved. Articles 2 and 
19 of the ICJ Protocol set out the relationship between the Commission and 
the Court as well as the conditions for referrals. The relationship, as 
described in article 2, was characterised as "supplementary" as the Court 
should "supplement the protective mandate of the Commission". 
Furthermore, article 19(2) spelled out that the Court: 
[M]ay not consider a case originating from other communications [complaints 
from individuals and NGOs - author’s comm.] and submitted to the Commission 
in accordance with article 55 of the Charter unless the Commission has 
considered the matter and made a determination. The Court may only deal with 
a case after the Commission has acknowledged the failure of efforts for a 
friendly settlement and within three months of a determination having been 
made by the Commission. 
In the ICJ Protocol it is clear that, from the perspective of the human rights 
NGOs involved, the relationship between the two institutions was to be 
organised in such a way that the Commission's mandate to hear claims 
originating under article 55 of the ACHPR would not be superseded by the 
powers of the Court. The Commission first had to consider and decide on 
an individual communication before the Court would gain jurisdiction. 
Importantly, the Commission would not be able to transfer a case to the 
Court before it made a decision. The conditions for considering 
communications under the ICJ Protocol clearly had the effect of making the 
Commission the principal organ. The reference to "a determination" as the 
restriction relevant to article 55 complaints is therefore significant in the ICJ 
Protocol.  
Furthermore, the ICJ Protocol opened up one important (direct) avenue for 
individuals, groups and NGOs to petition the Court. Under the ICJ Protocol 
it was proposed that the Court, notwithstanding article 19(2), could "on 
exceptional grounds, authorise persons, non-governmental organisations 
and groups of individuals to bring cases before the Court, without first 
utilising the procedures of article 55 of the Charter".35 In determining 
whether or not the Court would consider such a case the admissibility 
principles articulated in article 56 of the ACHPR would apply.36 This direct 
access does not exist under the current Protocol; the role of bringing this 
type of claim to the Court arguably rests with the Commission, where direct 
access is not possible.37  
                                            
35  Article 20(1) of the ICJ Protocol. 
36  Article 20(2) of the ICJ Protocol. 
37  Rule 118(3) of the Rules of the Commission; see para 5 below. 
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At the 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government the OAU finally got involved and requested the OAU Secretary-
General to: 
[C]onvene a meeting of government experts to ponder in conjunction 
with the Commission (…) over the means to enhance the efficiency of 
the Commission in considering particularly the establishment of a Court 
of Human and Peoples' Rights.38 
Thus, in 1995 a second draft39 (hereafter the Cape Town Protocol) was put 
forward, which for the first time saw the direct involvement of the OAU.40 In 
this document an important revision was made to the contents of article 
19(2) of the ICJ Protocol. Article 8(2) of the Cape Town Protocol noted that 
the Court should "not consider a case originating under the provisions of 
article 55 of the Charter until the Commission has considered the matter 
and prepared a report or taken a decision" [emphasis added]. Like the ICJ 
Protocol, the Cape Town Protocol established that the Commission could 
petition the Court and that under extraordinary circumstances to be 
determined by the Court, individuals, groups and NGOs could petition the 
Court without having to go through the Commission. An important distinction 
was made, however: the Court would have jurisdiction over a referral either 
after a decision by the Commission (as in the ICJ Protocol) or after the 
Commission had furnished a report. This opened up the possibility of the 
Commission comprehensively considering the matter on procedure or on 
procedure and merits. It could then either take a decision on the matter or 
report to the Court on its partial findings. Thereafter it could ask the Court 
to further engage with the matter. 
From these two drafts it is evident that the Commission would have the 
primary say in most individual petitions, except in extraordinary cases. It is 
also apparent that the Court would entertain communications originating 
under article 55 of the ACHPR only after the Commission had considered 
the matter and taken a decision or completed a report. Hence, the Cape 
Town Protocol opened up an alternative to a comprehensive consideration 
by the Commission.41 Referring a communication to the Court after 
considering the case in full would arguably engage the Court under art 19(2) 
                                            
38  Resolution on the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights AHG/Res.230 (XXX) 
(1994). 
39  Second Draft Protocol to the African Charter On Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of a Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU/LEG/ 
EXP/AFCHPR/PRO(I) (1995). 
40  Pityana 2004 AHRLJ 122. 
41  Article 8(2) of the Cape Town Protocol. 
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in a fashion similar to that in which the IACHR engages the IAC,42 as is 
further discussed under paragraph 5 below. The measure of a report would 
arguably be an alternative where the admissibility and prima facie 
jurisdiction could be considered in accordance with article 56 of the ACHPR. 
The Cape Town Protocol is silent on what type of report (i.e. the necessary 
contents of the report) the Commission would be required to issue, and 
where the report would be destined to go. Clearly the reference in article 
8(1) referring to article 52 of the ACHPR foresees a report stating the facts 
and findings to be sent to the concerned states and communicated to the 
Assembly. No such reference is made in 8(2), which therefore does not 
constrict the Commission to report to the Assembly. Such a report could set 
out the facts and the admissibility of the case at hand together, as indicated 
above, with an explanation as to why the Commission sought the 
involvement of the Court.  
In April 1997, the year before the adoption of the current Protocol, another 
drafting exercise was held in Nouakchott, Mauritania. This meeting 
produced the Nouakchott Protocol, which further elaborates on the 
positioning of the Commission and the Court in the new hierarchy.43 In 
article 5(1)(a) of the Nouakchott Protocol the Commission retained the 
competence to petition the Court. Through article 6 the avenue for 
individuals and NGOs (with the added requirement of "observer status") 
remained open in urgent cases or cases of serious, systematic or massive 
violations of human rights. In cases of this character the Court was obliged 
to "request[s] the opinion of the Commission which must give it as soon as 
possible".44 The Court was set to rule on the admissibility of 
communications instituted by individuals, groups and NGOs, taking into 
account the provisions of article 56 of the ACHPR. The Court could 
furthermore consider the case or transfer it to the Commission.  
Article 6(5), in addition, importantly introduced the structure that would later 
be transformed into the 34(6) declaration and the locus standi requirement 
proclaimed in art 5(3) of the Protocol.45 Article 8(2) of the Nouakchott 
Protocol was kept identical to that in the Cape Town Protocol. 
                                            
42  See para 4 below. 
43  Third Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of a Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU/LEG/ 
EXP/AFCHPR/PRO(2) (1997). 
44  Article 6(2) of the Nouakchott Protocol. 
45  Article 6(5) of the Nouakchott Protocol reads: "At any time after the ratification of this 
Protocol, the state must make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to 
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The last push to establish the Protocol was undertaken in December 1997, 
when the Addis Ababa Protocol was finalised.46 After a lengthy debate on 
article 8 the state parties represented concluded that article 8, as it had 
previously been formulated, did not cater for all the types of cases that could 
be brought before the Court.47 Accordingly, they decided that the heading 
and body of the article be amended. A new, single paragraph replaced the 
previous four paragraphs, and the word "Communications" in the heading 
was changed to "Cases". After this considerable re-draft it was presented 
before the state parties and unanimously adopted.48  
The final Protocol establishing the Court cements the importance of 
complementarity but defers the problem of defining it. However, it is 
importantly stipulated in article 33 of the Protocol that the Court, in drawing 
up its rules and procedures, should consult the Commission as appropriate. 
As noted by Elsheikh, this "consultation" would be essential in relation to 
articles 5(1) and 6 of the Protocol, which are concerned with the direct 
relationship between the Commission and the Court.49 
4  The complementarity arrangement and the referral of 
complaints under the Inter-American system  
To further contextualise the processes and procedures surrounding 
referrals, I seek to draw some distinctions and parallels between the Inter-
American human rights machinery set up under the American Convention 
on Human Rights50 (hereafter the ACHR) and the institutions set up under 
the ACHPR and the Protocol. Contrary to the ACHPR, the ACHR 
establishes both the IACHR and the IAC as organs that "shall have 
competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfilment of the 
commitments made by the States Parties". However, the authority of the 
IACHR to receive and hear individual complaints depends on a declaration 
                                            
receive petitions under the first paragraph of this article. The Court shall not receive 
any petition involving a State Party which has not made such a declaration". 
46  Fourth Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of a Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) Rev 1 (1997). 
47  Report of the 3rd Government Legal Experts Meeting Enlarged to Include Diplomats, 
para VII Consideration of Articles, art 8, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT (III) Rev 1 
(1997). 
48  Report of the 3rd Government Legal Experts Meeting Enlarged to Include Diplomats, 
para VII Consideration of Articles, art 8, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT (III) Rev 1 
(1997). 
49  Elsheikh 2002 AHRLJ 258. 
50  American Convention on Human Rights (1969). 
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by each state party, that it recognises this competency.51 Furthermore, all 
cases before the IAC are dependent on a declaration by each state party to 
the ACHR to the effect that it recognises the IAC’s jurisdiction pertaining to 
the interpretation or application of the ACHR.52 By way of explanation, the 
jurisdiction of both organs is restricted by the sovereign decision of state 
parties, whereas access to the Commission is not linked to a declaration of 
this sort. As states ratify the ACHPR they recognise the competency of the 
Commission to receive, hear and decide complaints received from 
individuals, while the jurisdiction of the Court in this regard is restricted only 
by the optional jurisdiction set out under article 34(6) of the Protocol.  
Moreover, under the American system the IACHR is the only body that can 
bring claims of violations of the rights of individuals to the IAC.53 The 
jurisdiction of the IAC, as per the declaration of state parties, does not per 
se provide individuals and NGOs with locus standi. In contrast, the Protocol 
does not contain an adjudicatory jurisdiction clause but limits the optionality 
to a decision on whether states will allow for individuals and NGOs with 
observer status before the Commission to gain direct access to the Court. 
It could be argued that since the Court is established through a separate 
Protocol, and not through the ACHPR, the decision to ratify the Protocol 
follows the same pattern as the adjudicatory jurisdiction clause in the ACHR. 
In both cases states have the option to ratify the main human rights 
instruments (the ACHR and the ACHPR) without running the risk of being 
exposed to the jurisdiction of the related courts. The noteworthy difference 
however is that the competency of the Commission is non-negotiable for 
any member state to the ACHPR.  
Against this background and in analysing the relationships between the 
Commission and Court on the one hand and on the other the IACHR and 
the IAC, it is important to acknowledge the similarities between the role of 
the Commission as set out in rule 118(1) of the Rules of the Commission 
and the role designated to the IACHR under the ACHR. Under rule 118(1), 
the Commission may bring a case to the Court if it has taken a decision with 
respect to a communication submitted under articles 48, 49 or 55 of the 
ACHPR and it considers that the state has not complied or is unwilling to 
comply with its recommendations within 180 days.54 This approach is similar 
to and comparable with the Inter-American system, with some important 
differences, as pointed out below. The ACHR, as mentioned above, allows 
                                            
51  Article 45 of the ACHR. 
52  Article 62 of the ACHR. 
53  Articles 57 and 61(1) of the ACHR. 
54  Rule 112(2) of the Rules of the Commission. 
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state parties and the IACHR to file complaints with the IAC only under article 
61, whereas direct complaints by individuals are enabled by the article 34(6) 
declaration under the Protocol. According to article 61(2) of the ACHR, the 
procedure in articles 48 (an examination of the case and trying to reach a 
friendly settlement) and 50 (where a friendly settlement is not reached) have 
to be exhausted before the IACHR can lodge such a complaint.55  
To elaborate on the relationship between the IACHR and the IAC, the Rules 
of Procedure of the IACHR (hereafter the Rules of the IACHR) have been 
established. Rule 44 of the Rules of the IACHR stipulates that the IACHR 
has to furnish a report on the merits of each case. The complainant has to 
be informed of the report and in cases where a respondent state has 
accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the IAC the complainant has an 
opportunity to present his or her position as to whether the case should be 
submitted to the IAC.56 Rule 45 of the Rules of the IACHR sets out the 
further procedure for such a referral. If the State in question has accepted 
the jurisdiction of the IAC, in accordance with article 62 of the ACHR, and 
the IACHR considers that the State has not complied with the 
recommendations of the report approved in accordance with article 50 of 
the ACHR, it must refer the case to the Court, unless there is a reasoned 
decision by an absolute majority of the members of the IACHR to the 
contrary. In making this decision the IACHR should, amongst other things, 
take the position of the petitioner into consideration. Importantly, when the 
IACHR decides to bring a case before the IAC it must submit a copy of the 
report adopted pursuant to article 50 of the ACHR, accompanied by a copy 
of the file before the IACHR, excluding any internal working documents and 
including any other document deemed useful for the analysis of the case. 
Under the Inter-American system a referral thus takes place within a 
process with better-defined roles of the two institutions involved.57  
                                            
55  See also art 47 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), which indicated 
that the European Court (before its merger with the Commission) could deal with a 
case only after the Commission had acknowledged the failure of efforts to bring about 
a friendly settlement. 
56  Rule 44(3) of the Rules of the IACHR stipulates that: "When the petitioner is interested 
in the submission of a case, he or she should present the following: a) the position of 
the victim or the victim’s family members, if different from that of the petitioner; b) the 
reasons he or she considers that the case should be referred to the Court; and c) the 
claims concerning reparations and costs." 
57  This is not to say that the Inter-American system is without is flaws and problems. See 
for example Viljoen 2004-2005 Brook J Int'l L 25 referring to Padilla 2002 AHRLJ 191, 
where it is indicated that although the IAC was established in 1980, it received its first 
contentious case in 1986 only and its second case 4 years later. 
A RUDMAN  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  14 
This is similar to the position of the Commission under rule 118(1) of the 
Rules of the Commission and the preparatory work, as discussed above. 
Under this rule the Commission finalises a case both on procedure and 
merits, and it is the state's response (or lack of response) that triggers the 
jurisdiction of the Court. However, one important difference from the 
procedure of the IACHR is the clear reference to the petitioners' input in the 
Rules of the IACHR. No such provision exists under the Rules of the 
Commission, which leaves the position of a petitioner undefined when a 
case is referred to the Court.  
5  The principle of complementarity in the process of 
referrals in the African system 
As mentioned in the introduction, the preamble to the Protocol spells out 
that the Court should "complement and reinforce the functions of the 
Commission". Under the Protocol the relationship between the Commission 
and the Court, the right to petition (locus standi) and the instruction to the 
Court in the consideration of referrals are set out in articles 2, 5(1)(a) and 8. 
Article 2 spells out the encompassing principle of complementarity. It states 
that: 
The Court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, complement 
the protective mandate of the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(…) conferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
In accordance, article 8 of the Protocol establishes that: 
The Rules of Procedure of the Court shall lay down the detailed conditions 
under which the Court shall consider cases brought before it, bearing in mind 
the complementarity between the Commission and the Court. 
It is clear that the compounded relationship between the Commission and 
the Court remains undefined under the Protocol and that power has been 
vested in these institutions to deconstruct and unravel these complexities. 
As was decided in Addis Ababa, it is up to the Commission and the Court 
to implement rules of procedure to provide further guidance in this regard. 
Central to this discussion, Elsheikh points to the idea that: 
The Court would not admit a case before the Commission has acted upon it, 
as the role of the Court would be that of appeal against the decision of the 
Commission.58 
                                            
58  Elsheikh 2002 AHRLJ 254. 
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In this regard the former Commissioner spoke not about the powers of the 
Commission but about the jurisdiction of the Court to hear cases brought to 
it under articles 5(1)(b) (relating to an inter-state complaint) and 5(1)(c) 
(relating to inter-state complaints and complaints made under article 55 of 
ACHPR appealed by a state party) of the Protocol. In other words, if the 
Commission has been engaged under the ambit of its protective mandate 
under the ACHPR, either through an inter-state or "other" complaint, the 
Commission would have to make a decision on the matter before the Court 
would gain jurisdiction with due regard to the complementarity principle. 
Elsheikh rests his conclusions on the supremacy of the Commission in the 
drafting history of article 8, which I related to above in paragraph 3.  
However, this does not settle how the Commission should approach 
referrals of individual complaints under article 5(1)(a) in the light of the 
complementarity principle. In this regard it is not, in my opinion, too far-
fetched to apply the same line of thinking, as expressed by Elsheikh, to 
cases brought directly from the Commission to the Court under article 
5(1)(a). I approach this line of argument below.  
5.1  Referrals by the Commission  
As briefly mentioned above, rule 118 of the Rules of the Commission offers 
four different conditions under which the Commission can refer an individual 
communication originating under article 55 of the ACHPR to the Court.59 
Firstly, the Commission can refer a case to the Court under rule 118(1) if a 
state party is unwilling to comply with the recommendations of the 
Commission within the stated timeframe. In this case, as established by 
Viljoen, the Commission has finalised the case and the process could, if 
utilised, resemble that of the IACHR's in its referrals to the IAC, as discussed 
above under paragraph 4.  
Secondly, if the Commission has made a request for provisional measures 
against a state party in accordance with rule 98 of the Rules of the 
Commission, and it considers that the state has not complied with the 
request, the communication may be transferred under rule 118(2). In this 
case the matter has not been finalised by the Commission and two different 
outcomes are possible; either the Court decides on the provisional 
                                            
59  It is pertinent to note that rule 118(1) of the Rules of the Commission does not refer 
only to individual claims but makes reference to inter-state complaints under arts 48 
and 49 of the ACHPR. 
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measures and sends the case back to the Commission or retains the case 
to make a decision in entirety.60  
Thirdly, if a situation that constitutes one of serious or massive violations of 
human rights, as provided for under article 58 of the ACHPR, has come to 
the attention of the Commission, it may transfer it to the Court under rule 
118(3).  
Lastly, the Commission may, under rule 118(4), seize the Court at any stage 
of the examination of a communication if it deems it necessary to do so. 
Under rule 118(1) it is clear that the Commission has finalised the matter. A 
decision has been made on both procedure and merits and this approach 
clearly fits within the discussion of the preparatory works above. It also 
resembles the procedure used in the Inter-American system. It seems to 
clearly delineate the functions of the two institutions. I will therefore not 
engage further with this procedure. 
However, with regard to (2), (3) and (4) it is clear that the Commission can 
have had little, very little or no engagement with the matter before it is 
referred. This is, as pointed out by Viljoen,61 probably "informed by the fact 
that the Protocol does not explicitly require the Commission to make a 
finding on the admissibility and merits of a case before submitting it to the 
Court". This, I argue, is an outcome of the re-drafting that occurred in Addis 
Ababa, as discussed under 3 above, resulting in the undefined instruction 
in article 8 of the Protocol. This is specifically highlighted by rules 118 (3) 
and (4), where the real conduit mechanism is created. As I am particularly 
interested in this "conduit process" I refer mainly to rule 118(3) and (4) in 
the discussion below.  
Before I engage with the process of referrals it is important to try to establish 
the differences between rules 118(3) and (4) of the Rules of the 
Commission. The first basic difference is the qualifications set out in (3) of 
"serious or massive violations" and the lack of qualifications and reference 
to "necessary" in (4). Viljoen suggests that (3) is distinguishable from (4) in 
that (3) would enable the Commission to bring a "case" to the Court on its 
own initiative based on information provided either by an individual, a group 
or a NGO, or obtained through any other channel.62 However, there could 
be, I suggest, an alternative interpretation. As all 4 sub-sections refer to 
                                            
60  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 428. 
61  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 428. 
62  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 428-429. 
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"communications", I propose that what can be referred to the Court are only 
complaints submitted to the Commission in accordance with the ACHPR, 
which are then acted upon by the Commission as the various sub-sections 
prescribe. Rule (3) reads: 
The Commission may, pursuant to Rule 84(2) submit a communication before 
the Court against a State Party if a situation that, in its view, constitutes one 
of serious or massive violations of human rights as provided for under Article 
58 of the African Charter, has come to its attention. 
It refers to rule 84(2) of the Rules of the Commission, which confirms that in 
conformity with article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol and rule 118(3) the 
Commission may refer "the matter" to the Court. Based on the reference to 
"has come to its attention" and "the matter" Viljoen supports the conclusion 
that the Commission's mandate to bring human rights violations to the Court 
has gone beyond matters that have been duly filed at the Commission as 
complaints. This, I suggest, is contradicted by the reference to "one or more 
communications" in rule 84(1) and the reference to "a communication (…) 
against a state party" in rule 118(3).63  
This matter is further complicated by the fact that rule 118(3) refers to article 
58 of the ACHPR. Article 58 seems to indicate that in this type of case the 
Commission does not have to formally make a decision on the matter to be 
able to pass it on. Article 58 refers to "[w]hen it appears after deliberations 
of the Commission", which could imply that a discussion at the Commission 
without a formal decision is enough to hand the matter over to the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Governments. However, it is unclear whether this has 
any bearing on the process before the Commission in reference to a referral 
to the Court. Is a deliberation without a decision enough to spark the transfer 
of the case to the Court in this regard? My interpretation of the reference in 
(3) to article 58 of the ACHPR is that this reference serves to substantiate 
the nature of the violation rather than the process, and that in cases relating 
to this type of grave violations the Commission has a choice either to follow 
the procedure set out in article 58 of the ACHPR or use the process to 
engage the Court. In engaging the Court, I argue that all four sections of 
rule 118 are (unfortunately) dependent on an initial complaint. I 
acknowledge, however, that with regard to (3) the process is indistinct and 
open for interpretation. This is furthermore buttressed by the fact that the 
interim Rules of Procedures of the Commission have opened up an avenue 
                                            
63  Juma 2012 Wis Int'l LJ 352-353.  
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for the Commission to consider situations without the reference to a specific 
communication.64 
In continuation I argue that rules (3) and (4) overlap and that there are types 
of communications that would not fit under (3) that would still necessitate a 
referral under (4). Viljoen has suggested that urgency is the main impetus 
of rule 118(4). These would be very specific communications, considering 
the scope of rule 118(3) covering serious or massive human rights 
violations. Arguably there is great overlap between "serious" and "urgent", 
as is also acknowledged by Viljoen in referring to communications triggering 
rule 118(3) as cases of "extreme gravity and urgency".65 Considering this, 
the reference to urgency under (4) seems to be somewhat redundant as 
many of these communications would fit under (3).  
What other types of communications remain? I would like to return to the 
idea under (4) of the unqualified conduit and the necessity of a referral that 
is determined by the Commission itself. In this regard it is also relevant to 
remember the reasons why the Commission would want to refer a 
communication to the Court, as mentioned above under paragraph 2. 
Considering the distinct "toolbox"66 available to the Court it could arguably 
be better situated to deal with some communications where the Commission 
has had previous experience of the state involved as not adhering to its 
decisions in similar matters. This is one of the plausible reasons why the 
Commission referred the situation of the Ogiek people of the Mau Forest to 
the Court in 2011.67 In November 2009, on similar facts, the Commission 
had considered the Endorois case.68 The Commission found in favour of the 
applicant (the same NGO that brought the Ogiek case to the Commission). 
However, the Kenyan government had since done very little to uphold the 
                                            
64  Rule 119(4) stipulates that: "[t]he Commission may also file with the Court a case 
against a State party that has ratified the African Court Protocol if a situation has come 
to its attention that, in its view, constitutes one of serious and massive violations of 
human rights as provided for under Article 58 of the African Charter". 
65  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 429. 
66  The procedures that the Court offers beyond those available to the Commission 
consist of: hearings conducted in public (art 10(1)); any party to a case shall be entitled 
to be represented by a legal representative, including free legal representation of the 
party’s choice (art 10(2)); any person, witness or representative of the parties 
appearing before the Court enjoys protection and all facilities necessary for the 
discharging of their functions, tasks and duties in relation to the Court (art 10(3)); the 
Court may receive written and oral evidence including expert testimony (art 26(2)); 
and, importantly, if the Court finds that there has been a violation of human or peoples' 
rights, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment 
of fair compensation or reparation (art 27(1)) of the Protocol. 
67  African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights v Kenya Application No 006/2012. 
68  Centre for Minority Rights Development v Kenya 2009 AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009). 
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findings of the Commission. In November 2013 the Commission issued a 
resolution calling on Kenya to implement its recommendations.69 In 
September 2014 the Kenyan President established a task force to deal with 
the Commission's decision. It has not, however, yielded any results yet.70 
The necessity in a case like this would arguably rest on the enforcement of 
the final decision. This prompts the question of whether bringing a case to 
the Court would yield enforcement or compliance. Murray and Long,71 as 
well as Juma,72 provide some useful insight in this regard. They point out 
that it is not the binding nature73 of the judgement that increases the 
likelihood of enforcement but rather that an additional body would interpret 
the provisions of the ACHPR which, in their opinion, would strengthen the 
findings of the Commission. Murray and Long74 add that the procedures of 
the Court to achieve compliance are ultimately stronger than those of the 
Commission. Importantly, the Court can and should make appropriate 
orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation 
or reparation, if it finds any violation of the rights set out in the ACHPR.75  
5.2  Complementarity in the context of referrals under rules 118(3) 
and (4)  
The discussion below focuses on referrals (i) in the context of a situation 
that constitutes one of serious or massive violations of human rights; and 
(ii) that takes place in accordance with the necessity established by the 
Commission. With regard to the latter I consider the scenarios set out above 
i.e. where the state has ignored previous decisions by the African 
Commission, and cases where the specific competence, measures or 
remedies of the African Court are required. 
Rules 118(3) and (4) of the Rules of the Commission seemingly allow for 
the Commission to be just a conduit; a method clearly refuted by the majority 
of the preparatory works, as discussed above under paragraph 3. As is clear 
from the analysis by Elsheikh, which is also referred to above, everything in 
the preparatory works of the Protocol seems to point to some sort of a 
decision by the Commission before the Court can assume jurisdiction.76 
                                            
69  Resolution Calling on the Republic of Kenya to Implement the Endorois Decision, the 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ACHPR/Res.257 (2013). 
70  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2015 http://bit.ly/23gUgjb. 
71  Murray and Long Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission 143-151. 
72  Juma 2012 Wis Int'l LJ 351. 
73  Article 30 of the Protocol. 
74  Murray and Long Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission 143. 
75  Article 27(1) of the Protocol. 
76  See para 3 above. 
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However, under rules 118(3) and (4) no decision or report is required. This 
brings me back to a consideration of what result an application of the 
complementarity principle would produce within the ambit of these two 
conduit scenarios.  
Arguably the two types of scenarios referred to above are differently 
initiated. In the first case the need for the urgent consideration of grave 
violations by the Court emanating in a legally binding decision may be one 
motivation. In the second scenario a legally binding decision vis-à-vis a 
previously unresponsive party and/or the need for a specific type of tool, 
expertise or remedy may possibly be the motivation. In both types of case 
it would forfeit the purpose of the referral if decisions on the merits were 
required. What I argue in favour of is not an in-depth involvement in the 
merits, which would in any event place the referral closer to rule 118(1), but 
instead a consideration of the admissibility of the case.  
There are a number of reasons why the Commission should conduct an 
admissibility enquiry. The Commission would arguably be better situated to 
consider the admissibility of a communication submitted to it. Even though 
the mandates of the Commission and Court are similar, the experience of 
the Commissioners, with regard to the process of state reporting and the 
development of special mechanisms (special rapporteurs, working groups, 
missions and committees) could be utilised in the process of preparing a 
case before the Court.77 Furthermore, as entrenched in article 1 of the 
ACHPR, the over-arching aim of the Commission and Court is to uphold 
these rights. As many complaints submitted before the Commission (and 
the Court) are declared inadmissible, the Commission could play an 
important role in assisting the complainant in remedying any lack in the 
complainant's admissibility claims.78  
A consideration and report on admissibility presented to the Court by the 
Commission could further alleviate the confusion as to the roles of the 
original complainants and the Commission when a case is referred to the 
Court. Within this context it is relevant to pay attention to the tension that is 
inevitably created in a system where two purportedly impartial adjudicators, 
the Commission guided by the ACHPR and the Court guided by the Protocol 
and the ACHPR, are to co-exist. As the Commission brings a complaint 
before the Court the proceedings are inexorably complicated by the 
possibility of the conflicting roles assumed by the Commission. As the 
                                            
77  African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 2016 http://bit.ly/1r9bFhv. 
78  Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 303. 
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Commission submits79 a case to the Court it acts as a litigant.80 However, 
cases referred to the Court are not generated by the Commission, and as 
such it arguably has to rely on the original party to some extent for 
information. As suggested by Murray and Long:81 
When submitting a case to the Court under Article 118(1) further evidence is 
going to be required on non-compliance specifically. The Commission is 
unlikely in practice to collate this itself, but rather it will be calling on the initial 
parties to provide what is necessary. In this context, the Commission arguably 
simply becomes a conduit through which the parties to the initial 
communication reach the Court. 
It is not unlikely that the Commission, I argue, would take the same 
approach towards the substantiation of the existence of grave human rights 
violations. Therefore, even if the Commission is the de facto party before 
the Court it is still substantially connected to and would arguably have to 
rely on the complainants for information. In this role it has to try to combine 
both the victims' best interest and the interests of the over-all system, as it 
is guided by its mandate in article 45 of the ACHPR and the fundamental 
principle of state sovereignty. Thus far only three cases have been referred 
by the Commission to the Court, as indicated above. Therefore it is too early 
to be able to conclude exactly what role the Commission will assume before 
the Court. It is inevitable, however, that the Commission, in this process, is 
pitted against the state party accused of violating the ACHPR; and under 
those circumstances the independence of the Commission can be 
questioned.82  
The main implication of rules 118(3) and (4) of the Rules of the Commission 
is that they contradict the idea of the reinforcement of the Commission's 
functions as stated in the preamble to the Protocol, as quoted above. It 
opens up the possibility of de novo consideration by the Court, which is 
particularly difficult in cases where the exhaustion of local remedies rule has 
been relaxed.83 However, whereas there might be good reasons for giving 
the Court the opportunity to pass judgement on the merits of the matter, I 
                                            
79  See rule 118(1) "[the Commission] may submit the communication to the Court"; 
118(2) "the Commission may (…) refer the communication to the Court"; 118(3) "the 
Commission may (…) submit a communication before the Court"; and 118(4) "the 
Commission may seize the Court". 
80  Murray and Long Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission 156-157. 
81  Murray and Long Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission 156. 
82  Murray and Long Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission 157. 
83  Both the Commission and the Court have declared communications and complaints 
admissible even though domestic remedies were not exhausted. See for example 
Jawara v The Gambia 2000 AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 2000) para 28-40; and Lohé Issa 
Konaté v Burkina Faso Application No 004/2013 para 77. 
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argue that the complementarity principle and the procedure set out in the 
ACHPR should locate the primary consideration of the procedure at the 
Commission. A failure to undertake such considerations poses serious 
challenges to the Court with regard to the duplication of the measures taken 
and the misuse of resources.  
The last step in this analysis is to put rules 118(3) and (4) within the context 
the Rules of the Court to further analyse any potential support for 
interpreting complementarity to promote an extended mandate of the 
Commission before a referral takes place. Rule 29 of the Rules of the Court 
gives expression to articles 2 and 8 of the Protocol. Rule 29(6) of the Rules 
of the Court confirms that for the Court to have jurisdiction over a 
communication that has been before the Commission, the Court shall 
ascertain that the said communication has been formally withdrawn. 
Furthermore, the evidence-related matters are set out in rule 29(3)(a-c) of 
the Rules of the Court. Rule 29(3)(a) spells out that when the Commission 
brings a case before the Court under article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol "its 
application shall be accompanied by its Report". This supports the idea of a 
"report" set out in the first three Draft Protocols.  
In a referral of a communication, rules 120-122 of the Rules of the 
Commission equally apply. Rule 121(1) indicates that when, in pursuance 
of article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol, the Commission decides to bring a 
communication before the Court, it shall submit an application seizing the 
Court in accordance with the Rules of the Court (which requires a report 
under rule 29(3)(a)), accompanied by a summary of the communication and 
the communication file. It is unclear from the Rules of the Commission if the 
reference to a "summary of the communication and the communication file" 
is to be understood as the report reflected in rule 29(3)(a) of the Rules of 
the Court. It is evident that the two sets of Rules differ in the terminology 
used.  
It is essential to further consider the implications of the lack of an 
admissibility and jurisdictional analysis by the Commission. If there is no 
such decision and no such report the Court will have to assert the 
admissibility of a complaint in relation to a party or parties that initiated the 
complaint at the Commission under article 55 of the ACHPR, even though 
the Commission, as discussed above, is formally the party to the case. It is 
incorrect to conclude that because the two bodies operate under the same 
admissibility criteria as set out in article 56 of the ACHPR it does not matter 
who performs the task of checking the admissibility of a claim. There is 
arguably a difference between the Commission's obligations under article 
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56 of the ACHPR and the Court's obligations under article 6(2) and rule 40 
of the Rules of the Court. The Commission "must" consider the criteria under 
article 56 of the ACHPR to make a decision under article 55, while the Court 
"shall" rule on the admissibility of cases "taking into account" the provisions 
of article 56 of the ACHPR under article 6(2) of the Protocol as referred to 
in rule 40 of the Rules of the Court. From this perspective it would make 
sense for the Court to receive a full admissibility report from the Commission 
that it could consider from the vantage point of not being completely bound 
by either the report or the full set of criteria. Furthermore, the Rules of the 
Court distinguishes between complaints brought by individuals and 
complaints brought by others (such as the Commission) as to what type of 
information needs to be furnished by the complainant. Rule 34(4) of the 
Rules of the Court indicates that an application should: 
[S]pecify the alleged violation, evidence of exhaustion of local remedies or of 
the inordinate delay of such local remedies as well as the orders or the 
injunctions sought. All applications filed by individuals and Non-Governmental 
Organizations shall meet the other admissibility conditions as set out in article 
56 of the Charter and Rule 40 of these Rules. 
Clearly, an application filed by the Commission would have to abide by the 
first sentence referring only to the admissibility criteria set out under article 
56(5) of the ACHPR. However, if the communication brought to the Court 
by the Commission is an individual complaint (the Commission is acting as 
a conduit under rule 118(3) or (4)) the other six conjunctive criteria in article 
56 (1-4) and (6-7) are arguably relevant and must be decided upon. It is 
therefore my interpretation that a full admissibility check is necessary, but 
that the Rules of the Court rely on the principle of complementarity, as is 
further supported by article 6(1), in that they entrust the Commission to 
consider all the criteria, while the Court focuses specifically on the 
exhaustion of local remedies. Nevertheless, it would rest its decision on 
information brought forward by the Commission, if substantial enough. In 
this regard it makes sense to have the Commission undertake a full 
admissibility check based on the seven criteria and to present the Court with 
its findings where the Court would focus on the often complicated legal 
issues surrounding the exhaustions of local remedies. In this way 
complementarity would work to delineate the functions of the two 
institutions, which would arguably save time and resources. Another aspect 
of the Court's comprehensive involvement in the exhaustion of local 
remedies is that as the whole system rests on the fundamental principle of 
state sovereignty the Court is obliged to make sure that the domestic 
jurisdiction has been properly utilised before the regional remedies are 
sought. 
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6  Conclusion 
The point of departure of this article was the application of the principle of 
complementarity in the process of referring communications from the 
Commission to the Court. As stated by Elsheikh,84 a "[s]uccessful 
functioning of the Court would depend, among other things, on a viable 
Commission which works hand in hand with the Court". However, as I have 
shown above, complementarity is a messy business, if roles, mandates and 
tasks are not clearly set out. The fact that states could not agree on a more 
specific formula for the cooperation between the Commission and the Court 
is evidence of just how hard it is to apply complementarity and define it in 
real terms. 
As I have argued above an unfettered application of rules 118(3) and (4) of 
the Rules of the Commission does not support complementarity. The idea 
of finalising the process pertaining to the procedure on the level of the 
Commission before approaching the next level of the Court, as set out in 
the Cape Town and Nouakchott Protocols, was arguably a good one. This 
is not, I argue, to say that we would always have to adopt the same 
approach as that taken in the Inter-American system, which is reflected in 
rule 118(1); where the Commission takes a decision on procedure and 
merits before a report is produced and referred to the Court. Arguably more 
flexibility was built into the African system. But to maintain the 
complementarity between these institutions it is crucial that the Commission 
applies articles 55 and 56 and undertakes a full procedural investigation 
before it refers a case to the Court under any of the avenues set out in rule 
118(3-4). The fact that article 6(1) of the Protocol provides the Court with 
the opportunity to ask for the opinion of the Commission in cases initiated 
under article 5(3) could be seen to support this argument.  
A referral by the Commission would in my opinion better fit with the principle 
of complementarity by (i) making sure that all admissibility issues are dealt 
with before the case is referred; and (ii) requiring the Commission to set out 
all its decisions and considerations in a report to constitute an integral part 
of the referral. This would arguably not only lessen the potential overlap 
between the Commission's and Court's investigations but it would also save 
the opposing party and the Court time and effort in delineating whether the 
claim has been properly conceived. I consider that the Commission would 
be better situated to undertake this type of enquiry as is so unmistakably 
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indicated in article 6(1) of the Protocol, and that it could in fact support the 
original complainant in overcoming certain admissibility hurdles.  
There will no doubt be cases where the Court would want to be more 
involved in the investigation of the procedure and process of the claim. 
However, in those cases a report on the admissibility of a claim would at 
least be a starting point. There will also, in all likelihood, be cases, as 
indicated above, where gravity and urgency would necessitate the swift 
action of the Commission and Court. However, as the instruments are 
formulated, all communications are conditional on admissibility, and even 
though there is a need to counteract the slow handling of cases at the 
Commission, excluding the consideration of admissibility from the process 
is not, I argue, the answer. There is no doubt that more financial and human 
resources could further facilitate the work of the Commission. However, it is 
when resources are not in place that the principles of complementarity 
should be applied in such a way as to maximise the resources available. 
This is one of the most important contributions of the principle of 
complementarity.  
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